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Abstract.  This article describes an introduction to and critique of intelligence support for aviation 
security. 
 
The four classes of intelligence activities are all germane to effective aviation security programs.  These 
four classes comprise intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, covert/clandestine action, and 
counterintelligence. 
 
Intelligence collection is of two types—human and technical.  Human intelligence refers to people as the 
actual collectors of information.  This information, hopefully, will be relevant to desired goals of an 
aviation security program.  Although a common perception among people outside the intelligence world 
is that most of this information will be that which is being protected by those who already possess it, a 
truer perception within the intelligence community is that most of this information is not being 
protected but is openly available.  Technical intelligence comprises information—again relevant to 
aviation security—directly collected through technological apparata.  Collection examples include but 
are not limited to a telephone tap picking up a voice or a reconnaissance satellite or aircraft picking up 
images. 
 
Intelligence analysis comprises the human and technical processing of information so as to generate 
meaningful statements about Issues germane to aviation security.  Human processing is dependent on 
prior knowledge and cognitive capabilities of the human analyst—as well as all other factors 
contributing to human performance.  Examples of technical processing include the systematic 
application of algorithms to data via computer software so as to identify predictive hypotheses.  In some 
cases, these algorithms can change during the processing that accompanies analysis reactive to and 
contingent on the nature of the collected data. 
 
Covert/clandestine action comprises all human action intentionally taken to influence the world in a 
manner supportive of aviation security—with the caveat that some combination of the action’s planning 
source, the identity of the actors, the nature of the action, and even the action’s consequences are 
hidden, masked, or suitably distorted to defy their accurate perception.  Examples include covertly 
distributing money among favored political actors in an election to help influence an electoral result, 
covert assassination, and various propaganda and disinformation campaigns.  Most examples of 
covert/clandestine action are deemed to be legal, ethical, and moral activities by the perpetrators and 
the converse by the targets—save for the deep recesses of the hearts and minds of the most 
Machiavellian targets. 
 
Counterintelligence comprises all intelligence activities taken to deter adversarial intelligence activities 
or to minimize the success of these activities.  One variant of counterintelligence, counterespionage, 
denotes efforts to deter or prevent the success of adversarial attempts to obtain information that is 
being protected.  Another variant is the covert/clandestine action of disinformation that can induce 
beliefs in an adversary so that even successfully obtained data that were being protected can still be 
misinterpreted during the adversary’s intelligence analysis. 
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All four classes of intelligence activities are interdependent and can be related to a continuously 
iterative intelligence cycle that also includes the production and transmission of analyzed information 
for the consumption of aviation security policy and program decision makers and managers. 
 
In the immediate and mid-term aftermath of 9/11, allegations about three significant shortfalls of 
intelligence activities have most often been featured in public discourse.  The first is that human 
intelligence collection and analysis is woefully inadequate because there are not enough individuals 
representing and constituting intelligence organizations with the requisite language and cultural 
expertise to obtain and understand information relevant to aviation security or to influence events in a 
desirable direction.  The second is that technical intelligence has been too successful so as to outstrip 
capabilities to attend to and analyze it in a responsive and meaningful fashion.  The third is that all 
intelligence activities—but especially intelligence analysis—have been captured by political leaders so as 
to subvert the potential accuracy, relevance, and value of these activities.  According to this last 
allegation, political leaders make decisions first and then seek to employ intelligence to support these 
decisions—even if most primers on intelligence in support of security advocate for intelligence informing 
decisions. 
 
Although there is some merit in all three allegations of intelligence shortfalls, there are also meaningful 
counter-contentions.  For example, human intelligence shortfalls may be mitigated by the competence 
of human intelligence case officers who possess and exploit expertise in identifying, developing, running, 
and terminating intelligence agents—and, through these agents, subagents.  With such generic 
competence, the need for expert knowledge in language and culture remains attractive but not vital. 
 
The shortfall due to the technical intelligence collection hyper-success may be mitigated (either 
gradually or with breathtakingly sudden speed) through novel developments in automated analytic 
methodologies.  Another possibility of mitigation includes more judicious development and application 
of collection methodologies including the delineation and prioritization of essential elements of 
information that could result in a higher ratio of relevant to irrelevant information within a lesser 
amount of collected information. 
 
The alleged shortfall related to the political capturing of intelligence activities is a timeless one and 
transcends specific cultures and historical eras.  Thus, it may signify truth, may be intractable and 
immutable, and may constitute an aviation security vulnerability.  On the other hand, some political 
theorists of security and power might suggest that there is less here than meets the eye.  In this regard, 
one might note that adversaries could have a similar problem.  One might also note that there are 
generic tools of implementing power against adversaries and increasing one’s security that transcend 
adequate intelligence.  Third, it is certainly the case that intelligence analysts and operational planners 
may be wrong and political leaders right about the nature of the world and what to do about it—in 
some situations.  Intelligence officers have no necessary privileged status in matters of the Truth. 
 
A fourth shortfall of intelligence activities is less often discussed but may be the most significant.  Any 
specific piece of information may vary through time in terms of its meaning and relevance for aviation 
security.  Decisions about what to collect and how to analyze may, therefore, be correct at one point in 
time and wrong at another.  Negative consequences for aviation security comprise information both 
ignored or discounted that later would have proven useful and at one time useful that later becomes 
irrelevant, inaccurate, and/or different.  More often than not, static perception loses, dynamic 
perceptual change wins.  (See Bar-Joseph, U., & Kruglanski, A. W.  (2003).  Intelligence failure and need 
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for cognitive closure: On the psychology of the Yom Kippur surprise.  Political Psychology, 24, 75-99; 
Eyck, T.  (2001).  Does information matter? A research note on information technologies and political 
protest.  Social Science Journal, 38, 147-160; Hergovich, A., & Olbrich, A.  (2002).  What can artificial 
intelligence do for peace psychology?  Review of Psychology, 9, 3-11; Pech, R. J.  (2003).  Inhibiting 
imitative terrorism through memetic engineering.  Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 11, 
61-66.) 
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